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A Scholastic Interpretation of Social Personality

Thomas J. O'Shaughnessy
Loyola University Chicago

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-- A

SCHOLASTIC INTERPRETATION
OF SOCIAL PERSONALITY

by

Thomas J. O'Shaughnessy, S.J.

A Thesis Submitted in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts
in Loyola University.

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VITA AUCTORIS

Thomas J. O'Shaughnessy, S.J., was born at Jersey City, New Jersey, June 13, 1913. He attended the Sacred Heart and Saint Paul's Parochial Schools and Saint Peter's High School of Jersey City from 1919 to 1931. The author attended Fordham University at New York from 1933 to 1935. He entered West Baden College, West Baden Springs, Indiana, an extension department of Loyola University of Chicago, Illinois, in August, 1935, and received his degree of Bachelor of Arts from that institution in June, 1937.

West Baden Springs, Indiana
June, 1938.

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Chapter I.

PERSONALITY, ITS NATURE AND IMPORTANCE

Nature of Personality.

Philosophical and educational publications have in recent years manifested increasing interest in the psychological aspects of personality. Since the opening of the present century the amount of literature appearing on the subject has more than trebled that published in the fifty years preceding.¹ In addition to the many books, both scientific and popular, that have dealt with personality, journals and reviews² have been edited in increasing numbers, linking that study to a number of allied sciences, such as endocrinology, sociology, psychiatry, pedagogy, ethics, biology, and anthropology, among many others. The sole task of synthesizing and classifying the literature appearing monthly on problems relating to personality and character has been undertaken by periodicals that are devoted entirely to such reviews.

Manifestations of this kind indicate a broader humane interest in man that is good in itself and is capable of imparting increased knowledge on a subject that has in the past received but little attention, at least if we regard its many social ramifications.

But as is generally the case with a newly developing branch of knowledge, numerous fads and quackeries, widely advertised in popular magazines, have become associated with the true study of personality. Many attempts, moreover, at an honest treatment of the subject from a scientific standpoint are vitiated at their source by the materialism or determinism which they presuppose. Such ill-founded theories and false speculations have frequently tended to debase a valid study to the status of a modern pseudo-science, strongly buttressed by the imagination, but failing entirely to conform to the world of reality and human experience.

Interest in personality, until but recently purely philosophical and theological in its implications, has its origin in the same trends that have brought about wide changes in the philosophical, literary, scientific, and educational developments of the last half century. Modern philosophies have become increasingly introspective in method; in literature, a subjective radicalism in poetry and the rise of the psychological method in the novel and in the treatment of historical figures has illustrated this tendency; physics, too, has increasingly favored an extreme reliance on rationalistic methods that dispense with the data of experience, particularly in recent a priori conceptions of subatomic structure; in education, finally, the trend has cry-

stallized in the application of psychological findings, often of doubtful validity, to the multiple problems of that very important process. In fine, the extreme subjectivity of modern thought and the spirit of humanitarian interest in the moral and physical uplift of man have evoked a corresponding interest in the subjective side of philosophy and psychology and in the countless applications of these sciences to modern life.

In this welter of subjective and rather undefined thinking, personality has assumed an unique importance. As a handy catchword that signifies a great deal without expressing anything embarrassingly definite, it has a widespread appeal in an age notorious for laxity of expression and vagueness of thought.³ Obscure though the word may be, it has yet acquired meanings, varying within certain limits in the various philosophical and social sciences which have adapted its metaphysical content to their respective purposes.

Among these widely varying notions, two which in substance contain all the others, present themselves as the most basic viewpoints from which personality can be studied, the metaphysical or psychological aspect, and the social aspect. The former is, of course, more essential since it considers personality in its own nature, and so provides an ontological understanding, standard, and test of social personality.

Metaphysical Aspect of Personality.

Philosophically considered, a person is a complete individual substance, rational in nature, incommunicable, and inherently one. In this definition are found the dominant notes of substantiality, rationality, incommunicability, and unity.

A person is, first of all, a singular substance, inasmuch as he exists in the real order of things as an individual, distinct from every other being and the subject and substratum in which inhere thoughts, emotions, desires; all, in short, that is accidental. Its singularity excludes the notion of universal substance, since a person is a being that actually exists outside the mind, whereas the universal as such, has no existence in the extramental order. This first note is clearly explained by Saint Thomas in the following words:

The term substance in the definition of person stands for first substance, which is the hypostasis; nor is the term individual superfluously added, forasmuch as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of universality and of part is excluded. For we do not say that man in general is an hypostasis, nor that the hand is, since it is only a part.⁴

And again:

The individual substance, which is included in the definition of a person, implies a complete substance subsisting in itself and separate from all else; otherwise, a man's hand might be called a person, since it is an individual substance.⁵

This substance, to be a person, must be complete; that is, it must form a complete nature and may not be part of another being, either actually or by aptitude. Hence, neither the form of a being essentially composite, nor the material part, nor a mere integral part can of itself be termed a person. Actual parts or those that of their nature are ordered to a whole, remain imperfect and lack the perfection and totality that are essential to a suppositum, and, a fortiori, to a person. Thus the human soul separated from the body after death and before the resurrection is still destined for union with the body to form the composite human being. Consequently, a disembodied soul, being a substance essentially incomplete, is not a person, but the personality of the departed one is held in abeyance.

A person is rational, for brutes, while nearest to man in the scale of material being, are, nevertheless, devoid of reason and so lack the rights and obligations that characterize a person.

In a more special and perfect way the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances; and this name is person.⁶

A person is incommunicable. Accordingly, were a rational nature to be absorbed into another nature, it would by that fact, no longer exist as a person in its own right, independent of all other beings. But a person is *sui juris*, the ultimate possessor of his own nature and of all its acts, the ultimate subject of predication of all his attributes. Consequently, a person subsists in himself separate from all other beings. This note of incommunicability perfects the notion of a complete substance already set forth; for a substance that is singular and complete is as yet not a person, unless it subsist as a whole entity in and for itself.

A person, finally, is inherently one, since the substance and nature proper to the human composite is one by reason of the substantial union that prevails between soul and body. To express the thought more at length, the rational substance or the person is the ultimate principle which acts, the nature the ultimate principle by which the rational substance acts. To affirm the unity of this nature is merely to state that man's soul and body, two incomplete substances in themselves, together form a unity, one single complete substance. The product of this substantial union is evidently capable of activity; when we consider it precisely in this light, we regard the principle of activity or the nature.

Thus has Scholastic philosophy reserved the word person for a substance master of its own actions, possessed of spirituality and independence of matter in its essence and operations and so raised above the whole material creation into a moral and spiritual world of its own. Persons may freely choose their end and the means thereto; their prerogatives of rationality, unity, and self-possession free them from subservience to any tyranny or domination, either to their own instincts and emotions or to the unjust coercion of other men or human institutions.

Personality, then, in its metaphysical connotation is the mode of subsistence proper to a person; it is that final complement that places the rational substance to which alone it is proper, in a state of actual incommunicability or ontological independence of another rational substance.

What imparts such dignity to persons, what makes a personality, is the supreme worth and glory of the Creator's most perfect handiwork. All creatures, indeed, share in God's perfection; the rational, however, more perfectly than the irrational. For this reason men and angels are rightly regarded as the images of God, but the irrational creation, in contrast, only as His footsteps.⁷ Man's rational soul, spiritual and immortal, sets him above the

fleeing shadows of sensible phenomena. Saint Thomas tells us that personality signifies what is most noble and perfect in all creation. "Persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura." ⁸

In the very philosophical concept of a person as an individual, rational nature, subsisting in itself, there is embodied a reason for the developing and perfecting of that personality's intellect, will, and emotions in due subordination and harmony. Briefly, it is that the perfection of the human person is proportioned to the perfection of the human nature which is essentially rational and spiritual. The note of individuality proper to a person indicates that the perfection aimed at is to be attained in the way most calculated to foster and develop those virtues and talents proper to each individual, just as the architects of medieval days sought with the means suited to each cathedral of their designing, to direct the eye to the high altar as to the center and crown of their masterpiece. The note of subsistence liberating the person from the fetters imposed by the lower nature and the opinion of men demands the development of the faculty of free will that it may consistently follow the guidance of rational principles, intensified by the promptings of noble emotion. Finally, as befits a purposeful being, this development of personality

should proceed with due order to man's proper end, which is to be found not in merely material or earthly good, but in the true and eternal good which is God.

Social Personality.

Hence we are led naturally to that other aspect of personality, in so far referable to the fundamental metaphysical notion. This second aspect of personality, the social aspect, puts stress on that totality of characteristics subsisting in the person, as they concern his relations to other people. A man must develop as an individual, but not as a solitary. Of his very nature he is destined for social intercourse with his fellow men. This social relation implies two terminals, the subject, which is here the human individual possessed of certain traits, and the object referred to, which is his human environment. When an individual possesses a group of intellectual or moral qualities that lift him above his environment and give him a marked influence over others, he is said in common parlance, to be a personality. Let us see how nearly this common notion expresses the true essence of social personality.

The exercise of such a social influence must obviously be identified with the outward manifestation, in word and deed, of the possessor's powers and abilities, but there is an element more intimately linked to the notion of

personality, which forms the inner source whence radiates the power over others. Superior intellectual or moral qualities alone do not necessarily guarantee this influence, even though they are almost inevitably associated with it. There is something more required to lift the individual above himself and to make him a force in the lives of his fellow men. What is this mysterious element whence comes such "personal" power?

In reply to this question it might be said, and not unreasonably, that such a power might have its origin in a strong will and natural ardor of temperament which dominates all it surveys by sheer force. This explanation would seem to have a basis in actuality. Luther was a personification of energy and raging might that swept all before him; Napoleon's sombre fearlessness and domineering ambition were irresistible powers while fortune smiled on their possessor.

But Luther's energy was an energy of temperament and animal emotion; a tragic, discordant thing that ruled its possessor, disintegrated and ruined his true personality. His undoubted power to sway the emotions of men marked him as a character potentially great. But Luther's greatness, as we know it, was a material greatness, not a truly human greatness; his power was the onrush of the

tempest, the violent passion of the wild boar, but not the calm, self-possessed energy of the soul working in harmony with the material part of his nature. Luther let himself be driven by longings that were born of instinct and not of reason; he made himself the center of all, and by his life contradicted an essential of personality, the unselfishness that is outstanding in the life of those truly integrated personalities, the Saints.

But Luther's egocentrism and unrestrained passion and the consequent disintegration of social personality are not uncommon in men of great native endowments. Napoleon, too, may be placed in a similar class, but for a somewhat different reason. Here, it would seem, was one who might fulfill the ideal of a social personality; surely a center of influence and power who dominated his environment, a man whose will and emotions performed the biddings of reason, a man moreover who attained astonishing success in the height of his power and was loved to the point of being idolized by those who obeyed him.

Yet the fatal tyranny of pride and ambition was the rift that brought disunity into this apparent ideal of social personality. Napoleon had, without doubt, social qualities that drew others to him, but his selfish ambition thrust aside from his path, everything, including the Faith;

his pride made him intolerable to those in his command who had immediate dealings with him. He lacked the element of true self-possession, which maintains a balance of the faculties and insures their unified action. In Napoleon reason was blinded by pride; an overdeveloped will imposed itself indiscriminately on all that opposed it; the finer emotions were suppressed to serve the interests of ambition.

Napoleon was self-centered, one-sided, and narrow; he possessed a personality, if by that is understood magnetic qualities that were inborn; but he fell short of being a social personality in the truest sense of the word, for that signifies an integration (capable of development) of the intellect, will, and emotions into a totality that is in harmony with man's material and spiritual environment.

Here, then, is the answer to our question; the mysterious quality that elevates intellectual or moral traits into a dynamic thing, a force and an influence in the lives of others, is the quality of balance and integration that permits the development of every faculty to its fullest perfection, yet consonant with the many other powers of human nature. The ideal type of social personality, therefore, connotes something more than the mere exercise of social qualities. It does indeed possess those traits and faculties common to every person, but in addition there pre-

vails that element of unity and coordination between the faculties, bodily, intellectual, volitional, and emotional, regulating their operations and preserving the due order and subservience in every set of circumstances, without allowing any faculty to dominate to the exclusion of the others.

Such a personality is found in men of selfless devotion to a great and worthy religious ideal, which is alone capable of developing all man's powers to their fullness; men who are free from domination by the things of sense, who have a satisfactory answer to the riddle of whence they come and whither they are going, whose values are subordinated to the one central value of eternity.

Such men as Saint Francis Xavier and Louis of France, the Saint-king, give us some indication of what Luther, with his wonderful powers of emotional appeal, and Napoleon, with his inborn qualities of leadership, might have been, had their lives been organized and their faculties integrated in the light of a higher purpose. Saints Francis and Louis with their capacity to lead and inspire their fellow men, well illustrate the true courage and strength of sanctity. Lack of virility and strength in an apparently holy person, springs not from goodness as such, ~~but~~ from an imperfect or spurious integration. On the con-

trary, man's true strength is proportioned to his sanctity; the meekest of the Saints will be found to be a stronger man than many of those, not Saints, who have gained a reputation for strength. What is sometimes regarded as weakness in a Saint is but the result of a true estimate of the worth of things that are valued highly by the worldly man, but by the Saint are seen to be of lesser importance in the clear light of eternity.

To select an example of similar balance and integration in a person endowed with poor natural ability, the Cure of Ars might well be chosen. Naturally, he was not a gifted man, but his faculties of intellect, will, and emotion were balanced and integrated in their operation by that one ideal and purpose,⁹ the love and service of God, that inspired and elevated their possessor's every action.

From what has been said of social personality, therefore, it is clear that it is a thing distinct from character as commonly understood, though in their use in modern psychologies the two have often been regarded as equivalent terms. Character is indeed something to be presupposed as a component of personality, but not as identical with it. Character connotes firmness of purpose; personality specifically connotes integration in view of one fundamental ideal or value. Character is primarily concerned with

strength of will, guided by reason, directed to action, and manifested in exterior conduct; personality looks to the harmonious integration of all man's faculties and powers into a totality that is the instrument of a high purpose. The man of character may be ruled by principles true or false in relation to his final end, with or without a resonance in his rational nature; thus was Napoleon a man of character; the man of true social personality effects the unification of all his faculties by the rule of reason, and in such a way that no power is exaggerated to the detriment of the others. Personality is distinguished above all else by unselfish self-control, which means not the crushing of man's powers, but the training and welding of them into a perfectly integrated whole, so that they mutually subserve one another in the interests of man's final end.

Of these powers and capacities which form the material of integration, some are naturally more important than others. In general, it may be said that since man is free and can reject the true in favor of the apparent good, moral training will always be a task more difficult than intellectual training. Intellectual, unlike moral training, is usually not opposed by home environment nor contradicted in practice by those who can influence the youth receiving such training. In the moral order, however,

free will is strongly withstood by man's lower nature and brute instincts. Intellectual training looks to but one part of man's nature, while moral training is concerned with the whole man.

Since a complete treatment of the integration of personality in all its aspects is beyond the scope of the present paper, it has seemed best to restrict the discussion to the moral phases of the question, particularly as they present themselves as problems to the educator.

Importance of Personality.

Systems of education are built and must ever be built on a people's concept of personality, and reciprocally, the development of a free personality or its suppression has always depended on the mental attitudes, customs, and traditions that characterize a nation's educational policy. When the learning process is made purely mechanical and suppressive of thinking on the part of the individual as was, and still is, to a large degree, typical of Chinese and of Oriental education in general, the development of a free and harmonious personality is impossible. The same is true of any nation where the consciousness of personality is smothered by a slavish sacrificing of the individual to human institutions, as to a caste in India or to a form of government in our modern totalitarian states.

All education should have as its prime purpose the integration of the individual's personality. His philosophy of life should not have to be adjusted to every change of circumstance nor should spiritual and moral disintegration be the price of an incomplete and one-sided mental development. Education should rather develop and manifest the personality of the man in its integrity and consequently in its true beauty; it should beget a serenity that springs from the power to penetrate beneath the superficialities which conceal ultimate and eternal values that are alone true and worthy of a rational creature.

Well in accord with such principles are the words of a modern non-Catholic philosopher¹⁰ who has truly expressed the fundamental aim of education with emphasis on its moral aspects:

The true end of all education is the complete realization of the ideal of personality. The character of this ideal cannot be determined by physical, biological, or even psychological considerations, taken by themselves, but must be defined in the broadest and most comprehensive terms, with moral and spiritual criteria as the final determinants of value. The ideal product of the educational process is a balanced personality; one whose body is the perfect servant of his will, carrying into effect the behests of a trained intelligence and the requirements of a scrupulous conscience; whose judgement is so disciplined as not to be readily turned aside by falsehood or befogged by sophistry; whose emotions are deep and strong, but under perfect control; and whose conduct is consistently directed in accordance with the requirements of truth and goodness.

In a special manner is the development of man's personality the aim of Catholic education. Christianity alone has evolved the perfect concept of personality, while the value and importance of the individual remains a basal element of Christian educational philosophy. For Christianity is founded on no abstract speculation on the nature of truth and virtue, but on the life of a Person Who is flawlessly perfect, Who actually lived our life and was seen among us. Christianity, moreover, exalted the concept of a personality by the importance it set on the individual soul as created by God and destined for life eternal with Him. Whatever else Christian education does, it must help to achieve the ultimate destiny of man that transcends, but never scorns, our temporal life, to concern itself with life eternal.

For the life of Heaven to which we are destined is not to be thought of as something accidental and disconnected in relation to our life on earth. Rather, the present life is a preparation which man must undergo in order to be able to live the life of Heaven. In so far as is possible, then, the grace necessary to live that life must be acquired by man in this present life. In Heaven we shall need powers which are not ours by nature, but can become ours by grace acquired now, grace that will enable

us to live this supernatural life towards which every human activity should be ultimately directed.

To attain this final end, as well as to ensure our present happiness and well being, the development of personality into the rich harmonic unity of all the faculties of body and soul is of the highest importance. This simply means that man must be master of himself; mastery of himself, in turn, demands a perfect coordination and integration of his powers, intellectual, emotional, volitional, unto the "perfect man in Christ."

N O T E S
(to Chapter I.)

1. Cf. A Bibliography of Character and Personality,
by A. A. Roback (Bibliography)
2. E.g.: Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology
Journal of Applied Psychology
Journal of Comparative Psychology
Journal of Delinquency
Journal of Education
Journal of Educational Psychology
Journal of Experimental Psychology
Journal of General Psychology
Journal of Social Hygiene
Psychological Review
Psychological Bulletin
Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic
Psychology
Psychiatric Quarterly
Progressive Education
Industrial Psychology
Genetic Psychology Monographs
American Journal of Psychiatry
American Journal of Sociology
American Journal of Psychology, etc.
3. Like many other words with which it is associated,
personality has acquired a large number of connotations,
some of which have departed far from the original mean-
ing of the word. The International Dictionary (Second
Edition) lists eleven principal meanings of the word
besides a larger number of minor distinctions.
4. Summa Theologica, I, 29, 1, ad 2/m
5. Ibid., III, 16, 12, ad 2/m
6. Ibid., I, 29, 1, c.
7. Cf. Donat, "Ethica Generalis, p. 92
8. Summa Theologica, I, 29, 3
9. Prescinding, of course, from the operations of grace
which are so evident in the life of Saint John Mary
Vianney.
10. Frederick Tracy, in The Psychology of Adolescence, p. 230
(Cf. Bibliography)

Chapter II.

INTEGRATION -- A TRIPLE FUNCTION

The Concept of Integration.

Order and harmony have a natural appeal to the human mind, for they are a reflection of the wisdom and perfection that exist in God. As the supreme Disposer, He has designed the march of the planets and the orderly progression of beings in every stratum of nature to their respective ends. The slightest swerving of any part of the universe from its appointed orbit would bring disruption and chaos into the system ordained by the Creator, nor would the purpose for which each part exists be any longer attained. Similarly, in machinery of man's designing, disorder and confusion frustrate the end just as surely as the harmony and the coordinate action of all parts attain it. The mighty printing press is halted; the powerful steam turbine can no longer thrust the bulk of thousands of tons of steel against a raging sea, if some single part in the working of the whole brings disunity into harmony by failing to perform its individual task in due order.

So have order and harmony a natural resonance in man, for they are an expression of that wisdom which God has deigned to share with His creature. All things in the order of nature and the realm of human invention are designed

to work in unity to their respective objectives. Likewise, in man, the faculties of soul and body by their integrated action and due subordination lead him, according to God's plan, to his true end. In the perfect order of things, internal conflict would have no place in man's nature. On the contrary, the natural and ideal state, to which we can approach, is a harmony well expressed by the word integration, which sets emphasis on the unity and wholeness of the compound of soul and body.

The integration¹ that is the final aim of personality development signifies not merely a summation of the faculties into a unit, but a coordination of these into a whole of interdependent parts. These parts are reduced to simplicity, and a diversity of operation to unity by the integrating power of self-control. This essential quality has its starting point in self-knowledge and self-respect prompted by the thought of one's origin and destiny. Where these dispositions regulate the faculties of soul and body, there is found the influence that is characteristic of a strong personality.

On the other hand, where the essential self-control and internal mastery are wanting, the person is at the mercy of his surroundings, self-possessed in some circumstances and, with some types of character, in other cir-

cumstances the prey of contention, envy, fears, inordinate desires for pleasure, and other disintegrating mental attitudes. Such a condition, of course, implies an emotional unbalance, a state where excessive and habitual yielding to emotions has resulted in their final domination over reason, and has produced a man ruled by his desires and impulses.

But the will, too, may overbalance a personality by ruling out the promptings of reason and the ennobling influence of controlled emotion. The man who is all will is intolerable in his extreme aggressiveness, defiance, and self-satisfaction. The disintegration found where the exclusive domination of intellect tends to hamper the other faculties is not less evident, though it manifests itself by different effects on exterior conduct. Intellectual knowledge, coldly segregated from the driving forces of the emotions and uncontrolled and unactivated in practice by the will, is as effective a factor in disorganizing the harmony of a unified personality, as is excessive domination by the will and emotions.

Any of the above described excesses may be substituted for by the contrary defects, producing, respectively, a person emotionally starved, vacillating, or devoid of sound judgement. In short, the disintegrated personality goes to the extremes of excess or defect in the exercise or

want of exercise of the intellect, will, or emotions. Such an incomplete, immature, or even "split" personality lacks that stabilizing influence of consistent action according to ideals and right principles which marks the integrated personality as master of itself.

Integration of man's spiritual nature with which this discussion is chiefly concerned, is not merely a coordination of powers, but a trinity of intellect, will, and emotions acting as one, steadfast in varying circumstances, and stabilized by the highest ideals and religious principles. The harmonic unity proper to an integrated personality originates in the one ultimate principle of right reason which directs the will in action, and secures the proper balance between emotional expression and control. To provide the theoretical norm, then, is proper to the intellect; to bring the actions into a consistent harmony with this fundamental principle of right reason is the part of the will; while from the emotions come the ardor, the intensity, the urges of enormous power and efficacy which may lift man to the heights of human and even heroic personal excellence.

Function of the Intellect in Effecting Integration.

The function of the intellect, therefore, in advancing the integral growth of personality, in so far as the present discussion is concerned, embraces a triple

objective: the acquiring of knowledge in the sense of intellectual habits, the establishing of correct rational principles of conduct, and the development of a mature judgement.

Mind marks man off from the brute and gives him his pre-eminence in the world of matter. Through mind man can mould his material nature to the standards of reason, as the artist can mould wax to the form he desires. Accordingly, intellectual habits are strong forces in the growth of personality, for they consistently regulate the inferior tendencies by sublimating them in the light of rational standards and by depriving them of time and opportunity for indulgence.

Knowledge may be pursued for its own sake or for a definite end, extrinsic to it; as, for example, to use it unselfishly in behalf of others. But it may also be utilized to reform the passions which can, in turn, by their direction into new paths, lead to the highest intellectual culture. Mental discipline acquired by earnest application to studies of an exacting nature, mathematics, for instance, or the classics, affords a great advance towards clear, reasoned, and independent thinking, as well as towards an accurate judgement and a strong will. The development of the esthetic taste and of the noble emotions is, in turn, aided by a study of great literature, both ancient and modern, in poetry and prose.

Viewed from the standpoint of a moral guide, the part of the intellect in establishing principles of conduct in conformity with objective good is not a small one. Its importance may be more easily understood when we consider the tendency on the part of some ancient philosophers even to identify knowledge with virtue. A true indication of this importance is to be found in the emphasis placed on mental prayer by men recognized as ascetics.

A principle considered apart from its volitional elements, is a generalized concept which is applied in conduct to regulate a multitude of details. It is, therefore, a standard of action essentially rational in the firm intellectual grasp and complete assent which it presupposes for its efficiency in regulating exterior actions. So much does the rational element enter into the notion of principle, that a definition of character as "life dominated by principles" might be paraphrased as "life (consistently regulated by the will) in accord with right reason."

Sound intellectual habits and a plan of life in the form of reasoned principles of conduct do not necessarily connote an ideal personality, if they are taken merely in themselves. On the other hand, the quality of mature judgement, which we are now to consider, is rarely dissociated from such a person. Julian the Apostate, the man of

culture and yet the fanatic, might have possessed the first and possibly even the second, but we cannot attribute to him that depth of judgement that distinguishes genuine virtue from the shallow unamiable virtue of the mere philosopher. Cardinal Newman sets forth the characteristics of this great apostate from Christian truth in masterly fashion, and concludes the sketch in the following words:

Such is the final exhibition of the Religion of Reason: in the insensibility of conscience, in the ignorance of the very idea of sin, in the contemplation of his own moral consistency, in the simple absence of fear, in the cloudless self-confidence, in the serene self-possession, in the cold self-satisfaction, we recognize the mere Philosopher.²

The truly integrated personality, therefore, should be marked by intellectual maturity; that is to say, regulating his practical judgement by his set of principles, he should form his own opinions and decisions in concrete circumstances and guide himself by reasoned motives in time of difficulty. He should manifest a legitimate independence of thought, in as much as he thinks for himself and applies the principles and standards he has formed to the contingencies of daily life. He is never classed with the person who indiscriminately and habitually seeks advice from others and whose views are determined by the last person with whom he has conversed.

Education that fails to train the youth in such clear and independent thinking and provides little or no discipline for the powers of reasoning, is worse than nothing, for at the age of maturity, it leaves the subject intellectually immature, a prey to suggestions from without, a member of the great army whose outlook and opinions are moulded by the newspaper, the radio, and the motion picture.

Function of the Will.

Granting, however, the importance of the intellectual element, it should withal not be overemphasized as a factor in personality-development. Knowledge is not virtue, or, more concretely, one is not determined by the greater good even though it be known as such. Human nature is ingenious in discovering and strengthening the motives for the act that flatters self-love -- even against the higher dictates of reason. But the will, consistently forming the exterior conduct on these dictates of right reason and objective truth, is above all, the directive principle, set aglow by the emotions and annealed by intellectual standards and ideals. It is the particular task of the will to insure that note of self-control, so characteristic of the integrated personality, and to oppose the disintegrating tendencies of blind instinct and uncontrolled passion.

For instinct and the self-determining faculty of free will are diametrically opposed.³ The freedom of self-control is calm, serene, deliberate; it makes its decision with full knowledge of the end to be attained, with clear understanding and moderation, in the complete possession of a coherent, balanced, and unified "self"; it makes man master of himself and of his actions. Instinct, on the contrary, is blind, inevitable, tumultuous, at the mercy of the occasion that presents itself, of the circumstances that awaken it, of the habits that determine it, of the appetites that lash it; it plunges on without deliberation, choice, or forethought. Unleashed, instinct with its consequent enfeeblement of the will, is a terrible power whose victims are indeed in the hands of a cruel master, the more cruel for the fact that their responsibility is not lessened, though their power to resist the onslaughts of instinct is. Dominated by passion, they sometimes strive to assert their liberty, not realizing their depleted strength. Then at last, awakened by their failure, they find their bonds drawn tight and their freedom all but forfeited to the force of evil habit.

The will, say psychologists, can sin by excess or by default. Pleasure marks its devotees with a double brand: impulsive to the point of foolhardiness when

pleasure prods them on, they are nevertheless weak and vacillating without this incentive. They have strength only to obey the voice of instinct, failing miserably when any effort to act otherwise is required. But the capacity of effort together with the power of free choice permits us to choose the path of greater resistance, frees us from the servitude of creatures, makes man his own master, both of his own end and the means thereto. Without the capacity of effort, there is no true mastery of self, no liberty, but only disunity in life and disintegration of personality. Man must rise above animality, mould his life by effort, possess himself by conquering himself.

Function of the Emotions.

The discussion of the will and the self-control it must exercise against the disintegrating tendencies of unbridled instinct and passion leads naturally to a general consideration of the emotions and their function in the integration of personality. The emotions, as has been previously noted, constitute the driving forces, whence spring the ardor and intensity required in following out a unified plan of life. Emotion is often confused with feeling, but in reality it comprehends more than that. Feeling is described as the awareness of the pleasantness or unpleasantness accompanying mental states or bodily actions, while emotion in man is feeling modified by intellectual

activity of some kind. More specifically, emotion can be defined as a "complex of feelings, complicated with sensations, images, ideas, tendencies to action, and directed toward a specific object." Scholastic philosophers are wont to consider emotions as either concupiscible or irascible, and define them in general as acts of the sensitive appetite proceeding from the apprehension of good or evil and accompanied by some bodily change. The concupiscible emotions or passions with their object "bonum simplex," something agreeable (or repugnant) in itself, are enumerated as love and hate, desire and aversion, joy and sadness; the irascible, with their object, "bonum arduum," a thing apprehended as difficult of attainment, as hope and despair, courage and fear, and anger. Modern psychology distinguishes between primary emotions, anger, fear, love (hate and aversion are sometimes mentioned), and the derived emotions embracing the modifications or combinations of the primary.

It is a fact that men tend to eulogize action prompted by reason and to stigmatize actions springing from mere sentiment. But it is a fact just as undeniable that the life of the average man is ruled more by emotion than by reason. Sentiment engenders prejudice, influences the judgment, spurs on to action, and very frequently determines a course of conduct. With the majority of men the heart rather than the head leads the way, and although this is

not the ideal, it is a fact made indisputable by human experience.

But emotions of themselves are not evil. They are so only when they are misused and become unmanageable through excess, disturbing the unity and harmony that the power of choice and decision procures in a rational being. Emotions, indeed, rightly used, are the stimulating powers in man's nature, holding the relation to the will (that of a necessary aid) that the imagination does to the abstractive faculty of intellection. Ideas unassociated with any strong sentiment or emotion are usually inefficacious. Much of the tremendous influence of ideals on the integration of personality, of which influence we shall treat directly, springs from the emotional coloring imparted to a type of human excellence that has aroused our admiration and emulation.

The importance of the emotions and their influence on human personality and conduct are well summed up in the words of a modern psychologist⁴ who writes as follows:

The meaning and value of life center in proper emotional responses. Nothing affects one's personality and character more than the quality of his emotional life. In the development of intellectual life, emotions are significant factors and they play important roles in the success and happiness of the individual. . . . To be starved emotionally is a tragedy, for without emotion life would be colorless. Likewise, the creative aspects of art, literature,

and science depend upon emotional stimulation no less than upon the imagination. Emotions should be cultivated just as the intellect or muscles are cultivated, through proper exercise.

Theoretically, it would seem a simple matter to bring about this necessary and desirable ordering of our emotional life, but original sin and the consequent weakness of our nature has ordained otherwise. Between the various elements that constitute the integrated personality, between the intellectual and emotional forces in man's nature in its sin-weakened state, there goes on that ceaseless inner struggle vividly described by Saint Paul: "For the good which I will, I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do." For "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that is in my members."

Man is, indeed, a free being, but because of this fatal weakness incurred by original sin, he finds his citadel besieged, surrounded by enemy forces which strive to win the will to their own side with promises of passing pleasure, battered and strafed from every side by foes that give him no rest. But in this conflict man has a mighty ally, self-control, the integrating force which implies so much and which is so difficult to attain in the face of the impulsiveness to which we so often yield.

Self-control, in the strict sense, is something more than the words would imply. No one is actually guided by a self-established norm, but in the last analysis by the final order of things established by God that preeminently befits man's spiritual nature and is the objective norm for all conduct. It implies, however, the free control by self of thoughts, emotions, and inclinations according to the standard that the conscience displays as good both for self, for the neighbor, and for the ultimate spiritual goal which is set for every man.

Self control -- inasmuch as it is the result of moral education -- is not a mental process, but a life process, and a unitary activity on the part of the whole creature, which results in a synthesis of knowledge and ideals in a person who lives and thinks as a unified personality.⁵

Self-control implies, therefore, not only intellectually apprehended knowledge of basic principles, though it certainly presupposes this, but effort expended in a higher and more complete mode of life. Like all living beings, self-control exercised by the intellectual being, life par excellence, is not a static, but a dynamic thing pertaining to the active, efficient side of human nature. The self-control of an integrated personality implies not the restraint of these dynamic elements, but the directing of them in accord with the highest ultimate good designed by God.

Consequently, proper control of the emotions does not mean the stamping out and strangling of all sentiment in life, even if this were possible. The true attitude is expressed in the words of the present Pope (Pius XI) in his encyclical on education of eight years past. Well may they be applied to the entire subject under discussion.⁶

The true Christian . . . does not stunt his natural faculties, but he develops and perfects them, by coordinating them with the supernatural. He thus ennobles what is merely natural in life and secures for it new strength in the material and temporal order, no less than in the spiritual and eternal.

The world would indeed be intolerable if there were no place for love, and sympathy for the unfortunate, and hatred for what is vile. The ideal to be set, then, is the proper ordering of the emotions in relation to the sum-total of man's faculties that constitute the personality, to secure the proper balance between emotional expression and control. The aim should be to weaken and eliminate the undesirable emotions by lack of exercise and to foster and strengthen the desirable.

In general, the personal emotions, such as self-esteem, self-love, pride, self-pity, anger, tend to dominate a personality and should accordingly be moderated, while the social emotions based fundamentally on sympathy, the intellectual emotions, whose basis is love of truth, and the esthetic emotions founded on the sublime, the beautiful,

and the harmonious, usually tend to deficiency and should therefore be fostered.

Control of the emotions may be secured in two ways, by controlling the conditions exciting the emotions or by controlling the expression of the emotions. The control of the conditions belongs especially to the intellect, and is accomplished by concentrating the attention on things other than those arousing the undesirable emotion, as anger or envy, or by avoiding occasions and causes that excite violent emotions.

Control of emotional expression supposes the exercise of the will in inhibiting impulses, elevating them by redirecting them into higher channels, and substituting a good expression for an evil; that is to say, one should not cease to hate; he must hate what is worthy of hatred; fear that is unworthy of a rational being should be converted into a salutary fear of God and His justice.

This exercise of the will in controlling the emotions is a characteristic note of the Christian spirit and constitutes the dominant force in the self-control of an integrated personality. The volitional control of emotional expression is reduced to practice by proposing to the mind the reasonableness and desirability of acting on principles, purposes, and ideals, rather than from impulse.

When the decision has once been made, its fulfillment is not, by the mere act of resolve, insured for all future time.

Volitional control is a continuous process that requires not only faithful and unswerving adherence to an immediate resolve, but a frequent refurbishing of the ideal, a constant repetition and renewal of motives and a recalling of the principles and purposes that bred that resolve.

Amid the disintegrating inner conflicts that rend fallen human nature, self-control with its basis in the will is one powerful factor in the fullest and most effective integration. The other, of supreme efficacy, rooted in the intellect and the emotions, is the concrete and living ideal of every Christian, Christ, Our Lord.

N O T E S
(to Chapter II) --

1. The present discussion is not concerned with physiological integration which is due rather to the coordinated action of the nervous system. Such integration is often confused with integration as here understood, especially in modern Behavioristic schools which deny the existence of the soul.
2. J. H. Newman, Idea of a University, Discourse VIII, #6.
3. Cf. "Le Gouvernement de Soi-même" by Eymieu, "La Loi de la Vie," p. 25 ff.
4. W.A.Kelly, in Educational Psychology, p. 158.
5. See Human Conduct and Character, by Rev. John M. Wolfe, p. 136.
6. Encyclical Letter Divini Illius Magistri, of Pope Pius XI; December 31, 1929.

CHAPTER III

CHRIST, OUR LORD, THE IDEAL PERSONALITY

Poets, philosophers, historians, and dramatists without number have endeavored in time past to portray human nature in its perfection, but the task of itself is, and will ever remain, foredoomed to failure as to its professed purpose. For descriptions that would represent a perfect man, though good as far as they have gone, can still never hope to include every possible aspect of human perfection even in the order of nature.

Man can, indeed, describe what is perfect, but only from his own experience, from the faults and shortcomings he has noted in others, by a negation of imperfection; in fine, he must paint a picture that includes both light and shadow, and without that shadow the light has neither form nor expression. An imperfect imagination and a language more imperfect still are his instruments, and in each specific case a different viewpoint and perspective will be expressed, true and noble in its own right, but nevertheless subject to the gaps and limitations imposed by a finite artist.

And so, if we look merely at such descriptions or at men as we know them, then, in the order of mind or nature, on the stage of drama or history, the perfect man does not exist. Whether he be a writer's creation, perfect

in its inclusiveness, or were he actually without flaw in himself, he would be something more than man in his present state, for fallen human nature is, in itself, replete with faults and imperfections.

But if we consider human nature, not as our experience has revealed it, but human nature elevated and borne aloft by something other than itself, human nature leavened by the leaven of divinity, then, indeed, the perfect man has had and has, not merely an ideal existence in the mind of the poet or the philosopher, but an existence real and actual. There has been and is now one perfect man, One in Whom no trace of fault or weakness can be discovered. Even today He inspires millions of human lives, by His example urging them on to ideals that are in direct conflict with their lower natures, to a complete sacrifice of every desire that would weaken their allegiance to Him. That perfect Man has called forth from the minds of those who experienced His personal charm and leadership, a description that most nearly approaches the ideal description of a flawlessly perfect human nature. For it is based on no abstract conception, but on a Person that really existed and even now dwells with mankind.

It is this perfect man, man and yet God, to Whom we must look for that ideal which will guide us to

the truest and most effectual integration of social personality. All indeed that this notion connotes is found in our Lord, Jesus Christ,¹ in its perfection. In Him emotions exercise their due functions but never reign supreme over intellect and will; these faculties in turn are perfectly coordinated, one with the other, into a perfect harmony of thought and action; tempered by the most ~~and~~ perfect and noble emotions.

True it is that in the more fundamental metaphysical sense, Christ our Lord was not a human, but a divine Person. Just as we, human persons, are endowed with a complete and independent existence apart from other beings, as we bear and possess our powers and faculties and are masters of our actions, so in our Lord, the second divine Person assumed these functions, with no change, however, to His human nature.

Still, in another sense, we may rightly say that our Savior possessed a human personality,² if we understand this term in its social meaning, as an integrated totality of intellect, will, and emotions acting as a perfect unity. Here then we look to the human nature of Christ which constitutes **His** social personality, for, as He is our model and inspiration, His characteristics as man are those with which we must here especially concern ourselves.

Strong and meek, austere and yet joyful, just and merciful, stern yet sympathetic, master and servant, our Savior combines in His social personality a wealth of ideal qualities. Many of them would seem to exclude each other; many, indeed, are rarely found in perfect balance in man as we know them, but resolve themselves into a multitude of partial and, frequently, conflicting qualities. Yet in Him they are all in harmony, nor can there be discovered any split between the workings of His various faculties. He is a personality, integrated and one in the truest sense.

An Ideal Intellect.

Considered purely as moral forces in His personality, the qualities of our Lord's mind are supreme. In the realm of knowledge, apart from that omniscience that was His as God, Christ, the perfect man, possessed in the highest degree that quality which distinguishes ~~the~~ the thinker truly great; a serene, penetrating mind, keen and perfectly disciplined, at the service of a will most powerful and yet most considerate. In the truest sense of the term may He be called the greatest philosopher, a genius without any of the limitations frequently accompanying exalted intellectual power and creative ability.

Witness His command over truth and its expression, the keenness of intellect manifested in His tilts with the hair-splitting Pharisees, "I ask you, if it be lawful on the Sabbath-days to do good or to do evil; to save life or to destroy?" "Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and to God the things that are God's." "And they (the Pharisees) marveled at him."

Again, consider His perfect knowledge of human nature that enabled Him to establish rules of conduct to develop the most noble in man. Behold the lucid simplicity of His teaching that was understood even by the most limited mind in His audience, yet its depth and profundity that have appealed to the thinkers of twenty centuries and still remain unexhausted and inexhaustible. Like the Hebrew doctors in the Temple, all that hear and understand, are astonished at His wisdom.

Richness and depth of thought in our Savior, however, were never accompanied by any of the confusion and over-attention to detail that frequently destroys the unity of modern thought. On the other hand, the discrimination, the clarity of insight and the analytic power of an intellect trained to distinguish essential from accidental are habitual qualities of the social personality of Christ.

These qualities are especially evident in the stand our Savior took towards the extremely involved affair that the Jewish thinkers had made of religion. For the common people the burden of complicated ritual, ablutions, and intricate legal observance had made life almost intolerable. The inward essentials of religion which these externals had merely meant to aid and express, the purity of mind and intention, the honesty of a good will, and the unselfish love of God, had been, if not entirely forgotten, at least seriously overshadowed by an exaggerated attention to exterior forms and observances.

Into this state of things our Savior stepped and with the precision of a perfect intellect set aside the accidental and summed up the essentials of religion in the brief, simple saying: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart and with thy whole soul and with thy whole strength, and thy neighbor as thyself."

This intellectual profundity and discrimination indicate another capacity of our Savior's, which perhaps above all others, characterized His life on earth; that capacity for contemplating things in the light of one unifying principle. Saint Thomas has called such a capacity wisdom, in this sense regarded as an intellectual virtue:

For since it is the part of a wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in any one order who considers the highest principle in that order.³

It is, then, a characteristic trait of high intelligence to unify the details of thought to a much greater extent than do lesser minds, to see everything in the light of a few simple ideas.

Viewed from this aspect, the life of our Savior above all others reduces itself to an admirable simplicity; for if there was ever one who governed his life in the light of one fundamental principle that imparted a unity and order to all he did, that man was Christ, our Lord. The principle requires no eulogy; it is in itself simple, yet all-inclusive, befitting man in the highest degree and a genuine remedy for his moral ills. That principle in the life of our Savior was conformity to the will of His Father.

In His life it shines forth in His relations as man, to God and to His fellow-men, as the single principle investing every action.

Did you not know that I must be about my Father's business?

My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me, that I may perfect His work.

That stern rebuke addressed to Peter, "Go behind me, Satan, thou art a scandal unto me," was inspired by that Apostle's

attempt to hinder the fulfillment of His Father's will in undergoing the Passion. His condemnation of the Pharisees came ultimately from the fact that they had substituted man-made laws and customs for the will of God. At the close of His life His cry was, "I have finished the work thou hast given me to do," "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit."

This following-out of the Father's will was not a blind, unreasoned course of action but the acknowledgment of an objective and supreme law of life; the just rendering of service due to the Creator, and a rational conformity to a rule by reason known to be infallibly right and true. In our Savior's case there was the additional motive of bequeathing an example that might inspire conformity of our lives to His, in regulating them according to the all-important will of the Father.

Maturity of judgement,⁴ too, in the natural order of growth characterized the actions of Christ even in His early years. At the age of twelve He displayed judgement and decision of one far His senior. Our Lord was never ruled by His environment, but His conduct, even in the most adverse and trying circumstances, was always guided by the law of reason.

Legitimate and worthy independence of mind marks our Savior's bearing as He stands alone in the midst of

those prejudiced and bigoted custodians of Jewish law, with minds cramped by jealousy, human respect, and stubborn pride, who "watched Him whether He would heal on the Sabbath-days, that they might accuse Him." It marks His firm refusal of those who would have Him ascend to Jerusalem, that He might "show Himself" and make display of His wonderful powers. It marks the folly of the Passion, that flying in the face of all human prudence which would scandalize even His own twelve.

An Ideal Will.

Intellectuals, however, often face the danger of confusing or substituting knowledge for virtue, of living in a world of ideals without the corresponding actions which require strength of will for their realization. Strength in doing good is the ideal quality of the will which, in its perfection, inspires tireless labor for a cause and insures courage and self-control in the conquest of selfish passion.

In our Savior an active and energetic will directed that tremendous energy that sent Him up and down the length of the Holy Land not once, but again and again; it lifted Him above the physical weariness that beset Him in many journeyings, in preaching, in healing; "Jesus taught and did." Even His enemies testify to the tireless labor in doing good that stands out as a principle of His life. "He stirreth up the people, teaching throughout all Galilee to this place."

In like manner the strength of self-control, an active, dynamic, self-control, is a ruling note in the Scriptural account of the life of Christ, our Lord. His was the self-control of an unselfish patience with disciples slow of comprehension and imbued with Jewish notions of a temporal Messiah; with a people obtrusive and selfish; with an upper class openly indifferent and contemptuous; with enemies that allowed Him no respite from their taunts and insinuations. It was a self-control that spurned Satan's triple offer in an hour of need; a self-control that ruled the very human desire for recognition when an enthusiastic following would have made Him king; a self-control, finally, that overcame the natural fear and repugnance that the detailed foreknowledge of His Passion brought, and enabled Him courageously to undergo a cruel death.

This courage and truly virile strength of will in reducing principle to action, without fear of human respect or regard for the opprobrium He was sure to incur, sent the Temple's defilers in headlong flight before His glance and left His carping enemies speechless before One Who feared not to denounce their falsehood and hypocrisy.

An Ideal of Emotional Balance and Control.

The mind of a genius, a mighty will, and a perfect balance seem to constitute an unsurpassable ideal.

Yet, taken alone, even in their perfection as we have seen them, there is still something absent, a natural complement that must be there to insure the perfect integration we find in the God-man. This complement is nothing other than the human poise and grace that come from the due exercise of the emotions, more specifically, the social emotions with their bases in sympathy.

Affability, sympathy, and friendliness are striking characteristics of our Savior's intercourse with His fellow-men. Such qualities as these brought the spontaneous, "Master, where dwellest thou?" from the lips of two future disciples, and the kindly response, "Come and see," from the Master. They illustrate a sympathy that extends itself to all, but especially to the sick and to sinner. These former are sought out, aided and healed by His miracles, most of which were worked in their behalf; in some towns, indeed, no sick people were left uncured at His departure. Sinners are never rejected as they were by the sanctimonious Pharisees; He has not "come to call the just, but sinners to penance."

The single incident of His loving kindness towards the children, that is recounted by three of the evangelists, gives us perhaps a greater insight into the great soul of Christ, our Lord, knowing Him as we do, than

any other one event related of His life on earth. "'Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not'... and embracing them, and laying His hands upon them, He blessed them."

How much more is a great scientist, a genius, a man of splendid talent, honored and loved, if he is at the same time a man of sincere and gracious affability, both loved by and a lover of children! It is a mark of that true and noble humanity which has borne no stifling at the hands of selfishness or eccentricity, a sign of the integrated and whole personality.

Again, this perfect integration implies an appreciation of the beautiful and a realization of the uncreated beauty which it symbolizes. To understand how perfectly developed was the esthetic side of our Savior's nature one has only to behold the beauty and yet the unaffected simplicity of His parables and prophecies. His sublime imagination reveals itself in the glorious and awesome imagery we find so frequently in His speech; "Satan falling like lightning from heaven"; "The Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven with much power and majesty": "And He shall send His angels with a trumpet and a great voice; and they shall gather together His elect from the four winds, from the farthest parts of heaven"; "and all nations shall be

gathered together before Him"; "Heaven and earth shall pass, but My word shall not pass"; "the hell of fire where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not extinguished. For every-one shall be salted with fire, and every victim shall be salted with salt." And yet it is reflected no less in the simple beauty of the "lilies of the field" and "the grass that God doth clothe," or the mustard tree which "shooteth up, and becometh greater than all herbs, so that the birds of the air may dwell under the shadow thereof."

Embracing all these, however, and gathering sympathy and patience and sublimity into a single whole, one emotion stands forth as the source and key to all the rest in that most selfless of lives. With our Savior's name alone as with the name of no other is love associated; love is the root of His universal sympathy and understanding; love made "all the world go after him"; as He taught it, love was indeed a new thing, a new commandment.

Just as the emotions and their proper control and expression are perhaps the greatest factors in the integration of personality, so is love the bond that insures the perfect harmony and unification of all the other emotions. Charity is the perfect instrument of integration, so much so that without charity and love, no true integration of intellect, emotions, and will, is possible.

Even if no mention were made of this unifying principle of love in the Gospel accounts of His life, its absence in the one perfectly integrated personality of Christ, our Lord, would be inconceivable. But that all-embracing, unifying love does reveal itself, almost literally, on every page of the New Testament, from the preludes of the Incarnation to the while-robed army described in the Apocalypse, of those who loved unto death. "Having loved His own that were in the world, He loved them unto the end." "The Son of God loved me and delivered Himself up for me." "Greater love than this no man hath, that he lay down his life for his friend." "A new commandment I give unto you: that you love one another as I have loved you, that you also love one another." This love He has fulfilled once on Calvary for all men, and even now fulfills in remaining with us "all days even to the consummation of the world."

An Impossible Ideal?

Such a personality has, indeed, the power of inspiration, and satisfies to the fullest the human need of a model. Still, at first sight, the perfection embodied in the Son of God would appear an impossible ideal. Where can we begin to imitate Him; how can we ever combine in ourselves the qualities of a perfectly integrated personality that we find in Him?

To this question there is a double answer.

In the first place, since our Savior is God, substantially perfect, and infinite in all His divine attributes, it follows that we, finite as we are, can never hope to attain the degree of perfection that resides in Him. Those actions of His which were the result of a supernatural power are, needless to say, not proposed for our imitation. The same is true of other actions which unique circumstances and authority justified, as His condemnation of the Scribes and Pharisees, which was motivated by His divine knowledge of what transpired in their hearts and by the fact of His divine commission.

But we can imitate the spirit of His actions, which was the unselfish spending of Himself and all He had for the sole good of others. In every case we must reduce His example to the humbler terms of human capability and apply it, together with the more specific points of His moral teaching, to our own individual lives, thus constructing in our minds the idea to be studied and realized, or at least aspired to, with all the ardor that the pursuit of the perfect good demands.

The second answer is that our Savior embodies in Himself an ideal that is not only superior in an infinite degree to every merely human ideal, but is, in addition, an ideal that is universal in its applications. No other among

men can be set as an ideal in every respect, since his virtues are inevitably accompanied by the failings of a fallen nature. Nor, on the other hand, can such an ideal permit of a universal application to all persons and to every condition and circumstance of life. But precisely this universal application⁵ is possible with the ideal embodied in the Son of God.

For instance, examples of this adaptability are found almost without number in the lives of the Saints. Saint Francis of Assisi became one of the most amiable of men by modeling his person on the simplicity, candor, and lowliness of Christ; Saint Camillus de Lellis beheld in his suffering fellow-men the image of God that was seen by our Savior as He raised His hand in healing benediction over the leprous, sinful outcast; Saint Ignatius of Loyola was an incarnation of the same zeal, by him redirected to God's service, that motivated every action and word of his King and Captain; "I honor my Father"; "I seek not My own glory"; "I have glorified thee on earth"; "I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do."

Each of His followers, then, may select from the abundance of ideal qualities found in Christ, our Lord, those which are in harmony with his own personality. The great advantage that such an independent creation of an ideal

has, is its origin, not from abstract ideas, but from the concrete and living characteristics of our Savior, which, being such, are the more likely to influence us.

In the final analysis, however, this influence of our Savior springs, not so much from His individual words or deeds, but from the hidden force of His personality that underlies all these; from that power of inspiring, from that ultimate thing which we feel to be the real Christ, the goal to which we aspire and the strength that supports our weakness. In His lifetime those who saw and heard Him were lifted out of themselves by the greatness of soul, the breadth of outlook, the loftiness of ideal, and the force of action which they beheld in Him, and such qualities would have awed and paralyzed them but for the deep sympathy and love of the Master Who was, at the same time, the Servant of all.

He better than anyone else, can teach us how to think, how to love, and how to make ourselves into the ideal of moral beauty which He revealed and which lives in us....For He came that men, by conquering that which is animal in them, should be like Himself and should have more and more abundant life. "Ut vitam habeant et abundantius habeant."⁶

- . Mark Christ our King. He knows war, served this soldiering through;
He of all can handle a rope best. There He bides in bliss
Now, and seeing somewhere some men do all that man can do,
For love He leans forth, needs His neck must fall on, kiss,
And cry, "O Christ-done deed! So God-made-flesh does too;
"Were I come, o'er again," cries Christ, "it should be this."⁷

N O T E S
(To Chapter III.)

1. Literature dealing with the life and teaching of Christ, our Lord, has been relatively abundant in almost every period of the Christian era. Excluding, therefore, first, theological treatises that pertain most strictly to Christology, and, second, the works of Protestants which especially in recent times are tainted with rationalism and are often in doubt of the Divinity of our Savior, the following works might be enumerated as anent the matter of the present chapter wherein our Lord is proposed as an ideal:

C. Fouard, La Vie de N.S. Jésus-Christ, tr. by Griffith;

M. Meschler, The Life of Our Lord Jesus Christ;

F.C. Fillion, The Life of Christ;

A. Goodier, The Public Life of Our Lord Jesus Christ;
Jesus Christ, the Son of God;

Jesus Christ the Model of Manhood;

J. Lebreton, The Life and Teaching of Jesus Christ,
Our Lord;

H. Doleridge, The Life of Our Life;

L. de Grandmaison, Jesus Christ.

Works in other languages than those mentioned may be found in the Catholic Encyclopedia under the headings, "Jesus Christ," and "Christology."

2. The use of the words "human personality" with reference to Christ, our Lord, is not without precedent. For a similar use confer J. Castiello in A Humane Psychology of Education, and compare Dom Anscar Vonier's treatment of the humanity of Christ in his book, The Personality of Christ, Chapter XIII.

3. See Summa Theologica, I, Q. 1, a. 6, c.

4. The Boyhood Consciousness of Christ, by Temple, contains a good exposition of the quality of mature judgment in our Savior.

5. Cf. the Encyclical on Christian Education, "Divini Illius Magistri," of Pope Pius XI, given in 1929, part IV:

"The price and value of the fruits of Christian education is derived from the supernatural virtue and life in Christ which Christian education forms and develops in man. Of this life and virtue Christ our Lord and Master is the source and dispenser. By His example He is at the same time the universal model accessible to all, especially to the young in period of His hidden life, a life of labor and obedience, adorned with all virtues, personal, domestic, and social, before God and men."

Notes to Chapter III (continued)

6. See A Humane Psychology of Education, by Jaime Castiello, p. 219.
7. Gerard Manley Hopkins, "The Soldier."

Chapter IV.

THE MOLDING OF THE SELF

Hitherto we have considered the integration of social personality from the viewpoint of theory rather than practice, emphasizing the ideal state that such a unified totality of the intellectual, volitional, and emotional faculties implies, rather than the specific self-activity that brings about this desirable condition. Definite factors in effecting integration have been mentioned thus far only in a general way, that their relation to the faculties to be integrated might be shown more clearly; but as yet these factors have not been considered under their own proper aspect as unifying forces in the process of integration.

Scope of Present Chapter.

Our general aim now is to set forth some of the more important factors which Scholastic psychology and Catholic educational practice regard as influential in effecting true integration of personality. In a discussion of such a limited scope as the present, an exposition in full of these influences would, of course, be out of place, but it will suffice to treat those which are more fundamental and which bear more immediately on the subject. Hence, influences springing, for example, from individual differences and diverse environmental conditions will not be considered explicitly in the present

chapter, since they pertain only indirectly to the matter under discussion and require a more complete treatment in themselves.

Another point that should be made clear is that in considering the factors that bear upon the integration of intellect, will, and emotions, no definite line of division can be drawn between the forces that influence each specific faculty, just as the faculties themselves are mutually interactive and inseparable in their operation. Nevertheless, in a general way integrative factors¹ such as self-knowledge, self-discipline, and self-respect can rightly be regarded as pertaining to the intellect, will, and emotions, respectively. Self-knowledge and self-discipline are more evidently connected with the faculties of intellect and will, but self-respect, whose intellectual and emotional aspects are not so easily distinguished, will stand further explanation when we come to consider this integrative factor in its proper place.

Self and Personality.

The emphasis placed on the word "self" has, no doubt, been noticed, and its reason, too, has very likely suggested itself. For it is a matter of personal experience to most of us that any self-improvement that is to be real and permanent is almost entirely a matter of individual activity.

Since man is a free and rational being, influences from without, considered absolutely and in themselves, can

affect him only insofar as he himself permits. Practically, however, they do exercise an unconscious influence on the individual that is stronger or weaker according to the subject's susceptibility or strength of will. Example, companionship, and similar extrinsic influences, therefore, due to the spontaneous response that is part of the instinct to imitate, modify the growth of social personality, but their rôle is secondary.

On the other hand, the forces that dominate and ultimately determine man's human actions, both interior and exterior, are internal forces, intellect, will, and emotions, all, in the last analysis, subject to the rule of the will.

This is not the place for a detailed discussion and proof of the doctrine of free will; but suffice it to say that such freedom is a reality, clearly evident from the testimony of the internal consciousness of mankind, from the universally accepted notion of man as a moral and responsible being, or simply from the otherwise inevitable contradiction that would exist between the spiritual faculties of man; for what the intellect would apprehend as not necessary would of itself necessarily determine the will. Hence, the futility of any theory that would deny human activity and make of man a passive creature under the thumb of environment, whether it attribute such passivity to the intellect in its learning process, as do the Traditionalist and Herbartian schools, or to

the will with the even more absurd doctrines of Determinism. Man is no pawn in the hands of a relentless fate, but an entity active and self-determining, the master of that fate and, as a free and conscious being, the builder of his own personality.

In any consideration of personality, moreover, and particularly where the formation and development of that personality is stressed, the notion of "self" and of "self-activity," as an easier equivalent for person, is of primary importance. Such importance follows, indeed, as a corollary from the concept of a person as a complete entity, subsisting in and for himself, the ultimate possessor of his nature, of its acts and its attributes, a substance wholly separated from any other. A person, as a rational being, has in addition, the moral attribute of self-responsibility, which carries with it an obligation to order his actions in accord with God's eternal law. Moreover, the individual person and no other, can alone posit the acts that will merit him an eternity of reward or punishment.

Self-knowledge.

With this importance of "self" in mind, therefore, we may proceed to consider more at length the integrative factors in the formation of personality. The starting point in the training of all the faculties leading to a complete integration is knowledge of self. The principle of self-knowledge,

in view of what they understood by it, was perhaps exaggerated by the sages of ancient Greece² when they emphasized it as the principle of all knowledge and perfection. But that their emphasis was not altogether unfounded may be seen from the important place self-knowledge holds today in the scheme of Christian asceticism. Indeed, as an essential in any plan of self-development, self-knowledge scarcely needs a defence.

Not only must we know our capabilities as human beings, composed of a spiritual soul and a material body, but also the superiority of that spiritual nature and its greater perfectibility and our relations as social beings to other men, for all these are proper to man as man, and illustrate the partial truth of the frequently exaggerated dictum of the humanist, "Man is the proper study of man."

But beyond this wider knowledge, we must know ourselves as individuals; we must know what are the capacities of this self-subsisting person different in his particular qualities from any other person that ever walked the green earth, with the sum-total of virtues, in which we may surpass our neighbor, and with an accompanying collection of faults that serve to exercise that neighbor's virtue. Just as a jewel, say a diamond, differs from every other in its planes of division, its grain and powers of refraction, and requires a special cut that must be determined by days or months of study and prepara-

tion, so each individual must learn the fibre of his own moral being, the peculiarities of its make-up, its powers of performance in times of peace and stress, its strength and resistance, its weakness, its plasticity. Equipped with this knowledge, he may strive after the ideal of perfection with better expectation of success.

To acquire a more perfect notion of what self-knowledge implies, it might be well to consider first what it in reality is not, but is often wrongly conceived to be. Self-knowledge should certainly not be confused with that morbid type of introspection which can never be directly productive of good results. Such introspection consists especially in an excessive scrutiny of motives, an habitual state of mental and moral disturbance proceeding from unreasonable causes and an exaggerated fear of moral evil. It is an introspection that thrives in a solitude sought out of misanthropy or as a means of escape from the restraints entailed by social intercourse; it is an introspection that is generally associated with a nature which is hyper-sensitive and wanting in courage to meet and overcome its difficulties. It is, finally, a useless introspection, for the problems that oppress such persons are generally nothing more than phantoms of an overwrought mind and disordered imagination. An instance of this unhealthy type of self-examination is manifest in the later monastic life of Luther, in whom it produced such evil effects.

On the contrary, self-knowledge should be an honest realization of one's strength and weakness, derived from experience, from changes in external conditions, from associating with those who attract as well as those who repel. It is a process of learning that is continuous with the task of conforming to the Ideal in the light of present knowledge. This process closely resembles the tests to which present-day manufacturers subject their products to determine their strength, adaptability, and durability. The tests in our case are the common happenings of daily life, and we, the makers of ourselves, carefully observe the points of stress, the tears, the strength, too, and the adaptability of the stuff of our own personality.

Varying conditions and circumstances are one of the greatest of all aids to a knowledge of self. Virtues and faults whose existence we never suspected in ourselves become manifest when the environment in which we have lived up to the present is suddenly changed for one that is very different. The patience and affability, the tact and courtesy and restraint which we had taken for granted, need but a little developing fluid in the form of rudeness, vanity, or boresomeness on the part of others, to bring out the corresponding shadows that were just as much "us" as our recognized strong points. Conditions that surrounded us in the past fitted in with our nature and temperament so perfectly that they had betrayed

us into believing that to be part of ourselves which was in reality the effect of our environment.

Knowledge of personal strength and weakness gained from such experience should help to regulate our future course of conduct by supplying us with matter for resolutions, determining what qualities are to be developed and strengthened as well as those to be supplied or eliminated.

Benjamin Franklin tells us in his autobiography of his method of attacking the problem of self-improvement. Having drawn up a list of those virtues which he regarded as needful in his own case, he set about the task of securing them by the use of a device known in ascetical terminology as the particular examen. Franklin practiced it by selecting some one virtue which he desired to acquire, by seeking occasions to exercise it, and recording his successes in a small note-book. This simple procedure was repeated daily after reflection on his conduct and a brief plea for help addressed to God, until he felt that the virtue had at least been strengthened, whereupon he passed to another, subjecting it to the same process. This examen was highly recommended by Catholic ascetics several centuries before Franklin, and if practiced conscientiously, cannot but be effective in the acquisition of self-knowledge and in the supplanting of defects with true virtue.³

Quiet and solitude, too, have long been recognized as conducive to a knowledge of self. Many monastic and eremetical congregations have made silence and solitude the basis of their rule, while a similar justification of this psychological means is to be seen in the importance with which founders of religious orders have credited it in their spiritual instructions.⁴

External solitude, however, is a thing impossible to most persons, even though their temperament would permit it, but interior solitude and recollection which may exist, in some measure at least, in conjunction with the external affairs that demand our attention is possible to all. A frequent and habitual entering into our intentions, accommodating itself to the ordinary course of our lives, will reveal to us almost subconsciously the motives inspiring our conduct, as the act itself is performed. Thus shall our life gain an intensity or depth which will remedy the irresponsibility characteristic of the extrovert and superficial person. From this source, too, will issue that moral balance and judgment that are so important in the maintaining of self-respect and self-discipline.

Self-Discipline.

Self-discipline, associated as it is with painful effort and the stern following of reason's biddings in the face of pleasure, is a word that grates harshly on the ear of

a modern pain-fearing age. And such associations are not unjustified, for self-discipline is always accompanied by pain and sacrifice and a constant vigilance against the forces of instinct, which often oppose the voice of reason.

Being such, self-discipline is shamefully neglected in the modern school and college, where with the aid of religion it should be especially developed, for natural motives, altruistic or otherwise, which are all public school training can offer, fail when there is question of denying self and acting against the lower nature for any length of time. Such a condition is all the more regrettable when self-discipline is so evidently a need in present-day social life. One author⁵ states this need effectively in the following words:

With the growth of democracy the need for self-discipline becomes not less, but far greater. When great bodies of men were controlled from without, then they were in so far disciplined; now that in all parts of the world men are shaping their own collective action without let or hindrance, the need for self-discipline is many times greater than it ever was before. In an older civilization self-discipline was necessary for the protection of individual character; today it is necessary for the protection of society and all its huge interests.

At the risk, then, of repeating something of what was said in a previous chapter on self-control, let us try to gain some knowledge of this important factor in the integration of personality. Etymologically considered, discipline is the process of learning or the treatment accorded a learner. Today

it is used in a broad sense to signify the training of the faculties, mental, physical, and moral, and thus understood, it is as inclusive as education itself. In a more restricted use it signifies the means employed to secure good conduct, whether these be efficient classroom management, the setting down of specific rules, or the punishment inflicted for irregularities. The relation of external discipline to self-discipline is that of a partial efficient cause, self-discipline being the most important result and the ultimate aim of the former.

Self-control already described, though sometimes used interchangeably with self-discipline, is rather the virtue or state acquired by such discipline habitually practiced. Self-discipline, then, may be regarded negatively as the restraint or refusal of one's own desires, positively as the performing of an irksome or disagreeable task for a proper motive. On the negative side a distinction should be made between a necessary self-restraint, when one's desire is directed towards what is forbidden, and a voluntary restraint, when there is no obligation to deny one's wish.

The value of such denial is centered chiefly in the motive that prompts it. For example, one might set out to conquer an excessive curiosity concerning his environment from higher religious motives, and more immediately to rid

himself of an unmanly habit that injures his powers of concentration. Such a person would soon learn that the pleasure forfeited did not involve so painful an effort after all, and that it produced no harmful effect in his life. He will learn the value of concentration and its good influence on his work and his inner life; finally, he will be encouraged to further self-conquest and will attain to a legitimate sense of self-sufficiency and independence of his environment.

Positively considered, self-discipline connotes a firm adherence to principle through force of will. Its worth again springs from the motivating cause which confers on each act its moral value. But to be an efficacious factor in integration, self-discipline in extending itself to every human act must be both universal and constant.

Its universality will make it a directive influence in the use of every faculty, of the imagination, intellect, emotions, and the will. This directive influence should remain directive in the true meaning of that word, never, therefore, tending to become a mechanical, deterministic force that destroys elasticity and vigor. The workings of the interior^{life}/regulated by self-discipline might well be compared to those of a disciplined army under the command of a skilled and well-advised strategist; granting, of course, due recognition to the inevitable limpings of the comparison.

An army's strength is in its discipline, so much so that weakness in organization is directly proportioned to the slackening of discipline. Military discipline is grounded in the respect of the inferior for the superior, and results in the concentration of all efforts towards the same end, which is, likewise, the aim of integration. For this it is necessary that the inferior render strict obedience to the superior, and individual superiors to the one supreme commander without regard for individual preference and gratification, or without striving to make themselves the center of all. The officers of an army are employed to perform their own tasks and not to direct the workings of the entire body. Similarly, in man the senses are the inferiors whose duty is discharged by service and not by domination; they have a right to fair treatment, but to nothing more.⁶

It may perhaps seem paradoxical to say that the will must exercise self-discipline over its own elicited acts; but, indeed, it must do just that. The will must be guided by reason, in the recognition of personal limitations, in controlling the feelings, in preserving equanimity in the inevitable clashes of life. Self-discipline that extends itself merely to regulating the exterior conduct without attention to the inner man who is in a truer sense the "self," is incomplete, and will eventually in time of stress fail to control even the external actions.

To be constant, self-discipline must become a habit that is strong enough to overcome the repugnance involved in the practice of self-restraint, and in the mortification of unruly passions. Such natural repugnance will sap the firmest resolve and bring loss of courage when it is most needed, unless the strength of habit can be summoned up as an ally. This sort of strength supposes consistency and firmness in the practice of self-denial, not, indeed, as an end in itself, but in the natural order as a means of strengthening the inner life and in the supernatural order as a means to the higher goals of Christian asceticism; reparation, and an increase in sanctifying grace and the love of God.

Self-discipline, moreover, must be gained through some measure of rightful self-expression. Self-discipline that is continually engaged in pruning and restraining and rarely in directing and cultivating the social faculties that humanize a personality, will almost inevitably produce an introvert, timid, unbalanced, person. One who is ill at ease with others, frequently embarrassed and ashamed, shows indications of a personality that lacks positiveness and completeness. Self-discipline must prepare the "self" to meet and overcome the buffetings of reality, without resorting to the sulkiness and sullenness that mark the personality unsure of himself.

Finally, self-discipline, either negative or positive, does not necessarily and directly involve a strengthening of the will, but rather supposes such strength. It does, however, make for the establishing of useful motives and helpful dispositions which are perhaps the most important factors in developing strength of will. This becomes more apparent when we consider some of the objectives of will training, such as firmness of purpose, promptness in reacting, and capacity to direct the other faculties to their goals.

The will, indeed, cannot exercise its power of free choice in the absence of all motives, nor can it arbitrarily choose anything whatsoever. The intellect considers the motives and then renders its judgment, whose standard the will in its actual choice and behavior may accept or reject. The preponderance of one motive results from its objective value and especially from the subjective disposition of the individual in its regard, but it is the final selection by the will of the motive, that produces action.

With due respect, then to the ultimate power of free choice, strength of will is largely dependent on a complex of values or logical concatenation of motives. To be effective this value complex should be suited to the individual in each specific instance and woven into a plan of life that is constantly before the mind.

The highest motives, however, are not always the most effective, for in practice the opposite is often true. Here a distinction must be made between motives high in the scale of objective values but low in that of values subjectively experienced; that is, God and eternity are certainly the highest of motives, but their influence on the ordinary run of men, even Christians, is not proportionate to their objective value. The reason for this has been previously remarked; simply that most men live not on reason primarily, but on their own likes and dislikes, passions, and emotions that are the products of a moment's reflection. Consequently, natural motives should be enlisted in the aid of those that are supernatural, while the object of the motive itself should be of such a nature as to retain its value permanently.

It is generally known that an isolated unit of thought is less permanent than one which is part of an extensive complex. This knowledge should be applied to the present case by not suffering the motive to remain unsupported in the mind but by building it into such a thought complex. The motive, moreover, besides being deeply imprinted in the mind, should be emotionally colored and prepared to move the will at the right moment. Saint Ignatius, in providing for an application of the five senses on the subject of Hell, shows us one way in which these two results may be brought about, even though the motive presented in this instance is a negative one.

Another way, which combines the advantages of a definite system with those of concreteness and vividness of association, is to be found in the presentation of an ideal, which will be discussed presently.

Self-Respect.

Self-respect might be regarded rather as a motive for self-improvement than a specific integrative factor in itself, inasmuch as without it there is little urge towards moral goodness and the realization of an ideal. Self-respect is primarily an integrative emotional attitude that is based on an intellectual sense of one's own moral value. The sculptor sees the possibilities in the block of marble or in the shapeless mass of clay that confronts him; the painter beholds in imagination the ideal of beauty that his canvas, pigments, and skilled hands can create. If man fails to perceive his own possibilities, his own value, at least in God's sight -- or rather, especially in God's sight, for that alone counts -- if he claims to be convinced of his own uselessness in life, if he is crushed by a sense of his own inferiority, then there is no incentive to reorganize his life according to the ideal.

This self-respect that is the soul of human effort is possible only if the individual appreciates his true worth. Hence the importance of knowledge of self as a rational being, of man's high status in creation, of his more

intimate sharing in his Creator's perfection, of his spiritual soul which is destined with his glorified body to enjoy the immortal vision of God. This knowledge engenders and was meant by God to engender self-reverence and appreciation which in this instance are but other expressions for a rightful self-love.⁷

Self-love becomes a vice only when it is excessive and inordinate; our Lord implicitly commands a legitimate form of self-love: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." The difficulty of the virtue lies not on the positive side, but in the fact that our nature makes it extremely difficult to strike the mean without inclining to the excesses that culminate in vanity, pride, cruelty, and an excessive desire for self-dominance.

A deficiency in self-respect may result in grave harm to the personality, and is frequently even worse than the excess. A lack of self-respect is a condition for a large majority of sins and anti-social acts. In the case of those habitually inclined to drunkenness or gluttony, or addicted to sins of the flesh, the will, in the act of sinning, has abandoned its self-respect in the blind quest after pleasure of the senses, even though remorse may follow upon the fall; those who are constantly depressed, shrink from reality, and are imbued with a sense of defeat are still far from an apprecia-

tion of self; the self-love that inspires the sycophant, the toady, or the person who places the promptings of sense before those of reason is a blind self-love that does not look beyond the present, and cheats itself of the reward owed to rightful self-love.

A balanced judgment and an unremitting practice of self-discipline joined to an accurate estimate of personal capability and an honest acceptance of personal limitation where it exists should rule out these excesses and defects. The elements of judgment and discipline, of course, allow of application to every department of human activity, but, waiting many possible lines of treatment, it seems best to confine the application to what seems most connected with the present subject; that is, to success-experiences as factors in engendering self-respect, for a certain amount of conscious efficiency is a necessity for a complete integration of social personality. Such a necessity helps to justify the old proverb, "Nothing succeeds like success."

Success-experiences are of extreme importance in the maintaining of a proper self-respect and confidence in one's power to fulfill his life mission. Success is an integrating element that is positive in its effects, but one which needs watching lest it lead to the extremes of independence and self-satisfaction. Its beneficent results can be

had only when the demands of the task do not too far exceed the capabilities which the subject possesses. Pupils generally like subjects in which they feel capable and make good grades, while in adult life the success of a work that has grown under one's own hands is one of the greatest of all incentives to future self-exertion.

On the contrary, continued failure destroys self-respect and leads either to rebellion against coercive influences such as social restrictions or the demands of law, and ultimately to anti-social acts; or on the other hand leads to an unhealthy submissiveness and a conviction of uselessness and inferiority. It is a fact borne out by the vocational histories of delinquents that much criminality springs from failure to succeed in other lines, nor is it difficult to understand how an individual whose self-respect has been impaired has little incentive to adhere to the moral code. The director of education in a state reformatory told a social worker that most of the boys committed had never known the satisfaction of success until they came to work in reformatory shops.

Self-respect is, as has been said, principally an emotional attitude which is, however, based on rational premises. Its importance as an integrative factor in the emotional life of the individual is not easily exaggerated,

for its exercise chiefly concerns the personal emotions and less directly the social, while its defect springs from an emotional disintegration and depression that inward fears and external occasions have forced upon the subject. It is a condition without which there is little urge to work towards an integration and development of one's faculties, since no one is inclined to expend effort upon that for which he has no regard.

Indirectly, at least, it influences the emotions directed to objects other than self, such as the social, intellectual, and esthetic. Sympathy towards others, love of truth, and an appreciation of the sublime, almost necessarily suppose an attitude of self-respect and a sense of one's own moral value. Self-respect leads naturally to a respect for others and to a sharing by sympathy in their adversities. On the other hand, love of the true and beautiful is smothered and forgotten in the individual whose latent persuasion it is that he is useless in life.

Christianity has not only augmented knowledge of self by imparting new insight into the obscure realm of inner motives derived from self-examination and the Sacrament of Penance, but it has made self-discipline a far easier task by supplying lofty ideals and a new source of power in sanctifying grace. In addition, it has provided man in a special

manner with many new motives for self-respect, highly efficacious in themselves and well illustrating the positive and integrative side of our Savior's doctrine. These have been succinctly expressed in the following manner by a contemporary Catholic author:⁸

The fact that he (the Christian) is a son of God, and the brother of our Lord, Jesus, Christ, is the real base of his self-respect. If he is powerless in human affairs, still he has before him the infinite possibilities of the moral order. A sick boy or a stupid boy may be useless for men; he is never useless for God, Whose Son died for him, of Whose Mystical Body he knows himself to be a sacred member. The most miserable of creatures is still the real or potential member of Christ's Mystical Body. Therefore he must respect himself and all other men must revere him and love him. And on the basis of this self-respect he can strive to make of himself a worthy temple of God.

N O T E S
(to Chapter IV.)

1. "Factor" in a very proper sense; cf. "facio" -- I make.
2. "Socrates undertook, therefore, first to determine the conditions of universally valid knowledge, and, secondly, to found on universally valid moral principles a science of human conduct. Self-knowledge is the starting point, because, he believed, the greatest source of the prevalent confusion was the failure to realize how little we know about anything, in the true sense of the word know Carried away by his enthusiasm for conceptional knowledge as a basis of conduct, Socrates went so far as to maintain that all right conduct depends on clear knowledge, that not only does a definition of a virtue aid us in acquiring that virtue, but that the definition of the virtue is the virtue." "Socrates" by William Turner in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, p. 120.
3. See The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin, Chapter IV.
4. As Saint Ignatius in the Spiritual Exercises; cf. especially Annotation 20.
5. N.M. Butler, The Meaning of Education, p. 127.
6. Cf. Le Gouvernement de Soi-meme, by Père Eymieu, S.J., Volume IV, ("Le Loi de la Vie"), p. 169.
7. Cf. Ethica Generalis by J. Donat, S.J., p. 117. "Idecirco per se nos ipsos magis amare debemus quam alios, 'quia (homo) sibi unus est in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine aliquius formae.'" Cf. also Summa Theologica, I, IIae, q.27, a.3.
8. Jaime Castiello, S.J., A Humane Psychology of Education, p. 125.

CHAPTER V.

THE IDEAL AS AN INTEGRATIVE FORCE

Having examined in the previous chapter the growth of social personality in fullness through the activity of the "self" or person, it remains now to consider the organization and unification of that personality in the light of an ideal. Such unification, as we shall see, demands of all the faculties a coordinated action and direction towards a single goal. This goal, as a final cause, insures the desired unity of operation that has previously been emphasized as an essential note in integration.

Dual Aspect of the Ideal.

Considered as an end or final cause, the ideal is the good perceived and intended by the person who directs the actions of all his faculties to its attainment. Only relatively, however, may the ideal in its common meaning be called a final cause, for it is subordinated as a means to the ultimate end of man, the glory of God and eternal beatitude. Yet the ideal as a being is an objective good and for this reason it is rightly regarded, from one aspect, as a final cause. When there is question of a false ideal, which is a mere subjective good, it must nevertheless be granted that its objective disharmony with the nature of the rational subject is not essential, but accidental; that is to say, the false ideal is

not false because it is an existing being or an ideal, but because it is lacking in some quality that the true ideal possesses.

More proximately, the final causality implied in the ideal is exerted upon the moral forces of the efficient agent or the person, in so far as they depend upon and are directed toward the ideal, for the person in positing such acts does so in view of an end to be attained. The ideal, then, is present intentionally in the intellect before the performance of the act; moreover, as a good and an object of desire on the part of the will, it excites love, deliberation upon motives, and finally, prompts the will to choose suitable means and to direct the faculties in their attainment of it as a proximate end. Thus is manifested the integrative action of the ideal in uniting means to a single goal by insuring unity of operation on the part of the intellect, will, and emotions in its role of final cause.

But there is another aspect under which the ideal is perhaps more commonly viewed since it sets a standard of exterior conduct without explicit reference to the notion of final cause; namely, the aspect of exemplar. As a final cause and an object of desire, the ideal primarily concerns the will; as an exemplar, it is both an object of imitation and an inspiration, and thus exercises a more immediate influence upon the intellect and emotions.

The ideal may be conceived in its more simple form as an external exemplar with objective existence outside the mind of the subject selecting it; thus might a boy choose his favorite cinema hero or the iceman as a model on which to base his own conduct. Generally, however, the ideal assumes the more complex form of an internal exemplar, which, though based on reality, is not an adoption in toto of some definite model, but is rather the result of selection, and embraces a number of desirable qualities seen at least imperfectly in many different individuals. Either type of ideal may consist of a phantasm or an idea or both; it must not, however, be a mere speculative conception, but a practical standard capable of directing the operation of the subject.

The ideal considered as an exemplar makes its basic appeal to the will and the emotions, as has been remarked above. The exemplar by its very concreteness and consequent vividness supplies the imitative element and satisfies the need of a model of conduct that is rooted in man's nature. By its elevation to the height of nobility, in the case of the true ideal, the exemplar is a source of inspiration to the emotions and of added strength to the will, as will be presently seen.

The Ideal as an Integrative Factor.

To indicate in general terms the influence of ideals as integrative factors is a difficult task, since in

this respect they differ widely. This difference, however, is not inherent in the nature of the ideal as an ideal, but in the accidentals of persons and circumstances, for the ideal properly conceived, emotionally colored, and willed is without doubt a mighty force in effecting a complete integration.

The factors in integration that have been discussed in the previous chapter aim primarily at the strengthening of one faculty, secondarily and indirectly at that of the others; but the presentation of an ideal is designed to develop simultaneously all the faculties that are the subjects of integration; the intellect in its moral aspect^{by} the judgment and self-knowledge that must be exercised in choosing and setting the goal that is in conformity with one's own personality; the will by the consistent effort required to follow the exemplar chosen; the emotions by contributing the drive and additional motive power which follows upon love and admiration of the exemplar. The ideal reduces to a unity of effort what other factors bring about singly¹; in so far it is a means more suited for the attainment of integration in the social personality, to which integration it is proximately directed.

The necessity of an ideal as a final cause follows from the truth that a purpose, to be realized, must first reside in the mind of the agent intentionally before it is fulfilled in reality. The ideal may be regarded as the

ontological idea of an integrated personality which the individual strives to verify in his own person, or as the pattern after which he molds his own personality. A man without an ideal is, in this sense, a man without a purpose, and one without a purpose will not only waste his temporal life, but will live to regret the waste perhaps in eternity, too.

As an exemplar the ideal is a necessary, even though unconscious, determinant in the life of every individual. The exemplar is not merely an objective which when achieved offers no further drive to action, nor, on the other hand, is it a mere standard that is imposed by convention. On the contrary it forever leads on to new desires and further effort in its behalf; it is a force that draws from ahead and has its foundations in human nature. Hence its necessity not only as a concrete model but as a source of emotional inspiration and of motives that are efficacious in arousing the will.

The Ideal Defined.

The word "ideal" has been variously defined. Like many other terms used in similar connections, it has as yet acquired no exact definition that is universally accepted, and is accordingly still open to misuse and false interpretation. In a wide sense, ideals are aims to which we aspire and towards which we strive without, however, necessarily attaining them. Strictly speaking, any individual trait that is made

the object of desire and purpose is an ideal -- thus we speak of ideals in the plural -- but generally a group of such ideal traits is joined together and embodied in a person. In this sense, then, an ideal might be defined as a type of excellence which we imagine as possible or desirable and which we aspire to realize in our life, or as a type of excellence which is desirable for personal imitation and towards which progress is possible.

Philosophically considered, the ideal is a type or a universal applied in a particular manner to an individual represented by the imagination. A type or universal is the result of abstraction, whereby we regard only what is essential and immutable in the object of perception, that is, its nature, leaving out of consideration all that is accidental, individual, and subject to change. Thus far we have an idea potentially applicable to all beings of the same nature, a type, philosophically defined as that which represents a single aspect of the object, generally its essence, which can exist in each of many individuals, and allows of univocal application to each of these same individuals. If, then, we imagine to ourselves a being conformed to this type, but free from defects and provided with a maximum of good qualities, we have a universal applied to an individual, or, in this instance, an ideal.

To illustrate: man is a rational animal composed therefore of matter and spirit; here is the universal or type that is applicable to every member of the human race. If, then, prescinding for the moment from the defects that accompany human nature in its present state, we assemble the admirable qualities that are found among our fellow-men and, harmonizing them into a single whole, embody them in one man, the result will be the ideal. This ideal, though essentially the same among all men, will admit of wide accidental variations among individuals.

Sometimes the individual's task of forming ideals is facilitated by the discovery of an ideal in a Saint or some other towering personage, historical or contemporary, who has aroused his admiration and emulation. Then he abstracts from the defects of that person or from such individuating notes that do not pertain to imitation, and selecting the virtues that are undeveloped or lacking in his own life, he proposes that ideal as an exemplar for personal imitation.

Thus, for example, the boy who reads the biography of Lincoln or of some other historical figure, or who more simply is inspired to emulate the example of his father, must universalize out of the many particular and individual actions of the admired person the qualities he would acquire. He must, moreover, perceive the relation of such

valued traits to the situations encountered in his daily life. Lincoln's rugged honesty, for instance, is impressed upon his mind by the various occasions in his life in which this honest conduct was apparent. These ideals are, of course, susceptible of growth, either from within by the boy's own reflection and resolve to pursue another ideal which, to him at least, appears more desirable, or from without by the positive inculcation by parent or teacher of an ideal that is gradually and prudently stepped up to a height that will inspire but not discourage; from the honesty, prudence, or magnanimity of a national figure, historical or contemporary, to the perfect manliness and humanity of Christ, our Lord.

The ideal as an exemplar does not limit the quality desired to a particular type of situation nor does it concern itself with individual acts merely as such. It is rather a generalized pattern of some trait or group of traits that should be clearly defined in the mind of the emulator. To elicit effort it must be emotionally colored and an object of strong desire. The purpose or resolve on the part of the will to make progress in the direction indicated by the ideal is indispensable, for otherwise the ideal remains incomplete and futile; it is perhaps an object of admiration, but the subject remains indisposed to labor in its behalf or to realize it, even partially, in his own life.

Thus taken, the tentative definition is verified; an ideal is a type of excellence which we imagine as possible or desirable and which we aspire to realize in our life.

The ideal, depending upon the subject's sound or faulty judgment, good or perverted will, controlled or unbridled passion, may represent what is most noble or degraded in human nature, the true good or the apparent good, of which two, one is at some time a dominant force in the life of every man. Though some may deny that they have ideals, yet they do propose goals of achievement, plan towards them, and fulfill the aims that are in accord with their own personality.

Although it is all-important that the ideal chosen be objectively true, it should nevertheless be noticed that the subjective tone imparted to it is a greater determinant of the influence the ideal may exercise. With respect to its suitability for the subject and consequently for its effectiveness as an integrative force, the ideal depends upon the individual needs and inclinations of the person choosing it. Hence the necessity of exercising due judgment and circumspection in the choice of an ideal, judgment, therefore, that is the fruit of experience and is inherent in a developed intellect.

The Ideal and the Intellect.

The role of the intellect, therefore, is to select an ideal that is in conformity with one's life-purpose and aptitude. If the ideal runs counter to the subject's needs and abilities, it is not good, for the good is that which is suited to and in harmony with the nature of a thing; such an ideal is, on the contrary, misleading and usually productive of ill results. The part, then, that the intellect must play is that of a wise and discerning arbiter, who selects the good and rejects the unsuitable and false ideal, and whose highest and most necessary virtue is that of a balanced judgment, rooted in self-knowledge and experience or in the teachableness that must often substitute for the latter.

Accordingly, the ideal should be chosen according to present needs, both with a view to supplying them and strengthening former acquisitions. This does not mean that the end-product of integration should conform to a set model, but that each individual, endowed with faculties differing in strength and perfectibility from those of every other individual, should see to it that his own qualities of soul and body work in harmony to their proper end.

The ideal is not necessarily directed towards the objectively highest values which demand the greatest sacrifice and effort but at the same time lack sufficient resonance

in the inmost self; such an impossible aim is harmful in its effects if for no other reason than that it induces the psychologically bad attitude of defeat.

On the contrary, the ideal proposed for imitation should conform to one's own personality and state in life; the subject should set before his eyes one who has successfully overcome difficulties similar to those which beset him, preferably the Ideal that is wholly positive, Who embodies in Himself the perfection of every noble quality, Whose human attributes, since they never lean to defect, can be applied to and made the aim of every type of personality. The ideal should never be artificial or unsuited to conditions of life under which the subject must live. The aim should be to establish the best and most noble ideals towards which progress may be made although complete realization may not be possible.

The Ideal and the Emotions.

Without striving in any way, therefore, to make the pursuance of ideals a matter of mere sentiment, for it is much more than that, we must nevertheless recognize the importance of the emotions in making the ideal efficacious. For the ordinary individual with whom abstract motives count for little, new ideals and incentives must be introduced and correlated with the strong emotional interests in his everyday life. New knowledge of the ideal must be integrated in the

apperception of the subject and associated with future situations that it may be a source of strength at the moment of need, when ideals seem to vanish like walls of sand in the face of the tide.

An excellent method of utilizing the powers of apperception and association to insure this reserve strength for future situations is proposed by a contemporary writer² on education.

Meditation (which is not mere auto-suggestion) consists in the conscious linking-up of our basic human interests with those higher ideals which are the ultimate norms of our lives. A young man, who feels the temptation to steal, stops and reflects. He considers the basic motives of his life: his bride to be, his family, his social standing, the love of his Creator; and he sees that all these are linked up with honesty. Such a meditation helps a great deal to reinforce his ideal.

The emotions are the driving powers in man's nature that carry him through and over the difficulties that the imagination would conjure up, were it left a prey to its own fears. Generally speaking, ideas and purposes remain ineffective without the drive of strong sentiment. One definition of the ideal in particular, well expresses both this relation to the emotions and the importance of the ideal itself as a unified integrative force:

An ideal is simply an idea which has been linked up with a series of concepts, images, and sentiments; an ideal means practically a force. Rooted deeply in the "apperceptive mass," it works as a powerful psychological unity, drives a man to action, and can become the dominant element in his life.³

The strength of the ideal as a factor in influencing conduct is, almost needless to say, proportioned to the ardor with which it is esteemed and loved. No one is inclined to imitate that for which he has little or no regard, which is tantamount to saying that the will is never drawn to decide in favor of what is not perceived as good. Consequently the effectiveness of the ideal is due on the one hand to the influence it exercises as a final cause, for the ideal is a good very close to human nature, since its chief concern is with the individual as a person.

On the other hand, the small boy who pictures himself a fireman, an air-mail pilot, or an all-American football star, puts himself in imagination in a position of power which commands the respect and admiration of his fellows, and which, if he really cherishes his ideal as an exemplar, will impel him to its achievement even in the face of opposition from without. Love, admiration, and a desire to emulate, appear to be the basic emotions linked with the perception of the exemplar and its pursuance, such sentiments being especially prominent in the following out of a religious and moral ideal, such as the imitation of Christ, our Lord.

The emotions, then, are undoubtedly momentous forces in the realization of any ideal. Indeed, it would not be too much to say that without the support and drive furnished

by the emotions, a course of action brought about by intellectual conviction and sheer force of will could rarely, if ever, go on without lapse for any length of time. The life of the emotions, being an integral and sometimes, unfortunately, a dominating part of human personality, forever manifests itself where opportunity offers.

The Ideal and the Will.

But may it be said as truly that the ideal, intellectually perceived and an object of intense desire, can without the strength of will that generally characterizes any consistent effort, mold a personality? Is strength of will in clinging to an ideal an essential, or is it replaceable, at least in individual cases, by the ideal or "idea-force"? To claim that strength of will is replaceable would seem an almost equivalent affirmation of the Socratic theory that identifies knowledge with virtue. On the other hand, it must be admitted that ideas do of themselves tend to overflow into action, as experimental evidence and certain theological notions of temptation indicate.

One modern authority, however, appears somewhat to overstate his view in support of the "idea-force" theory in citing an example such as the following:⁴

I remember a former pupil who was regarded by his teachers as a person of typically weak will....The boy had, however, an ideal; that of becoming an army officer....In spite of a very great obstacle...he reached his objective. During the war he performed heroic deeds which cannot be described here without identifying a living man....Many historic cases of this kind...justify...the following conclusion:

Everybody who is capable of conceiving a high aim can become a hero, and can achieve deeds which are expected only of a strong will, even if he has not the general quality of will power.

Against a theory of this nature there immediately arises a number of difficulties. The ideal is a light, but it is difficult to conceive of it as an elicitory agent. The ideal undoubtedly attracts us and, being a good, inclines the will to choice and accomplishment, but it does not in itself give rise to volition. Ideas may indicate the tendency toward action, but they are not automatically efficacious in producing action; especially when there are competing motives present. Otherwise there remains no satisfactory explanation for the fact that the great Ideal, that has inspired Christian martyrs to die in its behalf, has also had its slackers who, while admiring and exalting it, have nevertheless refused to adopt it as a life standard.

If, however, the ideal is strongly desired and loved, it must by that very fact have an effect on the will which such theories appear to neglect. If we are satisfied not merely to contemplate the light of the ideal, but exert our will, in which our strength finally lies, to the point of making it one with ourselves, the ideal will, without ceasing to be a light, simultaneously become a source of strength. The "idea-force," then, is not only the ideal perceived and emotionalized; it must also be the ideal willed.⁵

Thus, in reference to the ideal the functions of the will are perhaps best summed up by considering it in relation to the dual aspect under which the ideal has already been explained. The will plays a very important part in that it maintains a concentration of mind and emotions upon the goal towards^d which progress may be made. Consistent and purposeful conduct that keeps the ideal in sight as a final cause, in view of which the person fulfills the duties of every-day life, especially when such a fulfillment involves repugnance, is obtained only by effort on the part of the will.

The exemplar, too, in order to be effective as an integrative force must frequently be revived and reestablished as a guiding force in action by a refurbishment of the motives that have prompted the person to fashion his life upon such a model. This review of motives and associated emotions presupposes a realization of its importance and a corresponding energy on the part of the will to inaugurate such a spiritual "shake-up" to counteract the dulling effects of monotony and routine. Often the ideal may lose its drawing force and the exemplar its faculty of arousing enthusiasm; then it is that the will must exercise its power to keep the person faced towards the yet uncut furrow, never turningⁿ his back on the ideal that discouragement paints as impossible.

Inadequate Ideals.

Before relinquishing the question of ideals, it might be well to consider some of those that have in the past exerted a certain degree of influence and which today are often glorified as goals of human endeavor. Certain ideals, even if indifferent or good in themselves, are yet too limited in their requirements to serve as satisfactory exemplars of integrated social personality. One such inadequate ideal, whose influence springs mainly from the tendency of moderns to regard the external semblances of decency with little concern for what lies beneath, and is augmented by its professed dissociation from any religious "bias," is the ideal of the gentleman of refinement and ability.

In such an ideal the chief emphasis is placed on qualities that make for social attractiveness, honesty, self-control, courtesy, tact, and adaptability. This ideal undoubtedly calls for a number of sterling qualities which, to be lasting, must be more than surface-deep. Still, it labors under two serious defects. Besides making religion and its principles a matter of indifference, it permits ethical lapses which Christianity could never condone. The good points which are in reality part of the Christian ideal, are worthless as a counterpoise to the violations of the moral law which cannot be excused or tolerated because they are committed in a "gentlemanly manner."

For the very reason that it aims merely at bettering the exterior, the school of worldly experience seems more successful in producing men who are types of this amoral and conventional excellence than the Church does in developing the "true and perfect Christian." Cardinal Newman states the reason for this apparent disparity in a manner both concise and to the point.⁶

The world is content with setting right the surface of things; the Church aims at regenerating the very depths of the heart. She ever begins with the beginning; and, as regards the multitude of her children, is never able to get beyond the beginning, but is continually employed in laying the foundation. She is engaged with what is essential, as previous and as introductory to the ornamental and attractive.

If not as commonly inculcated, perhaps, as the ideal of the urbane and self-possessed gentleman, the ideal of wealth and its concomitant power and independence is a goal even more delusive and disintegrating in its effects than the former. Not only will the esthetic and intellectual side of the money-getter be in all probability neglected, but his moral life is apt to suffer an even greater stunting. The self-regarding emotions, self-esteem, pride, self-reliance, tend to dominate such a type to the great detriment of the social and artistic emotions based on sympathy with one's fellows and with the beauty found in nature and art. In like manner, moral principles are all too frequently shelved and conveniently forgotten by the man whose prime purpose is to earn money and insure its

possession in whatever way he possibly can. Such an ideal is little more than the deifying of the ignoble extreme of selfishness that tends to engross man in the purely material and to leave him without time or thought for anything beyond the immediate and present good.

Another similar "this-world" ideal is the ideal of greatness or strength which is not only in itself inadequate, but often positively harmful when its logical implications are expressed in action. Strength connotes first, the ability to overcome opposition from without, and secondly, the offering of positive resistance by the individual to external forces. The primary opposition man encounters proceeds from his fellow-man, and the "strong man," a type frequently met with in these days of totalitarian states and dictators, is the one who can effectively quell any resistance within his organization. The ideal of mere strength sets a false goal that must eventually conflict with reality; moreover, it runs counter to the Christian law of charity inasmuch as it makes of one's fellow-man an instrument of the individual's selfish aims.

The second connotation of strength, namely, resistance to outside forces is, naturally considered, apt to be regarded as something good in itself, whereas in reality it is good only in relation to that against which it is offered. Resistance as a good in itself easily leads to the errors of

voluntarism and the type of subjectivism that disregards values existing outside the person.

Greatness, unlike strength in that it depends on the opinion of others as opposed to personal experience, is an ideal even more delusive and injurious and cannot without evil consequences be sought for as a goal in itself. It is an ideal that leads to day-dreaming and inaction, and arouses a false ambition which, left unsatisfied, bears the evil fruits of disillusionment, misanthropy, and despair.

The Religious Ideal.

In contrast to these the religious ideal alone presents itself as capable of bringing about an integration that is based on an adequate concept of human nature and is concerned with the development of man as a creature of God, who is destined for eternal life. The religious ideal alone unifies man's present life in relation to his more real future life; it directs his endeavors towards the highest possible goal, the service of **his** Maker. It sets a supreme purpose and a final end to human existence and provides man with a stable system of moral values which serve him as a norm to determine the relative worth of the created things that surround him. Without a religious ideal, man's powers, intellectual and moral, are scattered and disintegrated, just as the universe without God is transformed into a welter of seemingly conflicting laws and useless

fragments. Without spiritual and religious ideals capable of controlling the innate selfishness and greed of humanity, there is no power that can weld confusion into harmony or the excesses of personal ambition into the balanced unity of the integrated social personality.

The religious ideal par excellence is the living personality of Jesus Christ, our Lord and King. In Him, as man's ultimate end and final cause, will the human personality find its true expression in the fullest and most complete exercise of intellect, will, and emotions freed from all that palls, and enduring to everlasting length of days.⁷ In the personality of the Son of God become incarnate is embodied the perfect exemplar, the source of the highest and most noble inspiration, the ideal that alone can urge men on to ever greater efforts to reenact it in their own lives. Such a reenactment is both the goal and the secret of sanctity and the pledge of eternal life: "That they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, Whom Thou has sent."

N O T E S
(To Chapter V.)

1. This, however, in a wide sense, for the other faculties are developed at least indirectly when one is exercised and strengthened in performing its own functions.
2. Reverend J. Castiello, S.J., in A Humane Psychology of Education, p. 129.
3. Ibid., p. 174.
4. Reverend J. Lindworsky, S.J., The Training of the Will, p. 74.
5. We are, moreover, often told that courage and heroism con-
note not merely a lack of fear which may be due to a phlegmatic
and unimaginative temperament, but the positive downing of fear
by strength of will. Fear is an emotional attitude and in so
far must be controlled and subdued, or at least kept within
proper limits, by the will. It would seem, therefore, that the
apparently weak officer had developed and strengthened his will
to perform the heroic deeds with which he was credited.
6. In The Idea of a University, "University Teaching," Dis-
course VIII, no. 8.
7. Cf. Aristotle, Ethics, I, vii, 15, 16.

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